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Abstract 
 
Denial of Service (DDOS) continues to be a threat to exhaust network bandwidth 
and host sources.  The attack on the target cause it to shut down, thus denying 
service to the users. The wireless networks have many security issues having 
characteristics of not bounded by walls. However, these type of networks, due to 
its broadcast nature are more prone to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. No need 
of special type of hardware or any high experiences is required to make these 
networks inoperable by DOS attacks. In this work techniques for detection of dos 
attacks that exploits physical layer like location strength consistency and signal 
strength consistency is discussed and implemented. Also, many of DDOS attack 
tools exploit IP Spoofing technology resulting in difficulty to filter illegitimate 
packets from amassed traffic. An attacker can falsify IP address field in the IP 
header, he cannot falsify hop count value to its destination. This hop count can 
be calculated through TTL (time to live) field in the IP header. Based on this 
observation, a technique called Hop Count Filtering (HCF) is discussed and 
implemented. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can be defined as attacks attempting to prevent 
users from accessing the network, denying the availability. DDOS attacks do not 
let legitimate users access the network by exhausting victim resources, instead 
of sabotaging services. These attacks are not motivated by selfish behaviour 
rather by possible beneficial outcome. Wireless networks are easy target of DOS 
attacks, due to its broadcast nature. 
To cover flooding source traces, attackers use random 32 bit source-address field 
to spoof IP addresses in the IP header. Attacks such as smurf and DRDOS 
(Distributed Reflection Denial of Service) attacks, are impossible without IP 
spoofing.  The Internet protocol has no means to prevent a sender from hiding 
its packets’ origin. DDOS attacks becomes harder many folds to detect and 
counter, due to IP spoofing. 
 
 As discussed earlier we will only use IP header’s information for packet 
filtering. An attacker can falsify any field in the IP header, he cannot fake the 
hop count of an IP packet, which depends on the Internet routing infrastructure. 
The TTL field of the IP header indirectly reflects the hop count value, since each 
router in the source to destination route decrements the TTL value by one before 
forwarding it to the next node. The hop-count from the source and the 
destination is calculated through subtracting initial TTL value at the source by 
final TTL value at the destination. By evaluation of each arriving packet’s TTL, 
the initial TTL value can be deduced by destination, and thus the hop-count from 
the source. In this work, a hop-count-based filter to detect spoofed IP packets is 
implemented. 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The convenience of wireless networks have led to widespread deployment 
worldwide. But they are vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks due to 
the broadcast nature of wireless communication. Henceforth we are persuaded 
to work on the DOS attacks focusing on its detection. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Given a network traffic dataset, we analysed it and tried to detect whether the 
network is under DOS attack or not. We analysed packets to check for jamming 
attack and applied hop count filtering for defence against IP spoofing. 
 
 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
A brief introduction is about denial of service (DOS) attack and its detection is 
given in chapter 1. The rest of the thesis includes 4 chapters. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – In this chapter various denial of service attacks 
and its detection are discussed. 
Chapter 3: Proposed work – In this chapter techniques of detection of DOS 
attacks are discussed and implemented. 
Chapter 4: Simulation Results – In this chapter results of our implementation 
is shown. 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future scope – In this chapter our conclusion of 
our implementation is given along with the future work that could be done.     
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 DoS in the physical layer of 802.11 
DoS attacks which attack in physical layer are also known as jamming. This attack 
prevents any node to successfully transmit or receive packets in physical layer. 
Thereby resulting in packets not to be sent to higher layers. 
DoS attacks in the physical layer can be classified according to their targets, timings 
and energy budget. Some of the attacks based on these attributes are as follows.  
2.1.1 Resource Unlimited Attack (RUA): If the attacker possesses unlimited sources 
virtually (i.e., energy, power, and bandwidth) then in a wide frequency range is blocked 
by it. As a result blocking the devices in that range and bandwidth. Even if much 
weaker jamming signal is present compared legitimate frame signal transmission it will 
easily disrupt the legitimate transmission [1]. 
  
2.1.2. Preamble attack:  Continuous transmission of SYN pattern by a jammer prevents 
a node from synchronizing from other nodes. In these cases significant amount of 
frame losses happen [1]. 
 
2.1.3. Reactive attack: Transmitting continuously empties the jammer's energy 
resources. Reactive jamming is a better and energy-efficient jamming technique.  In 
such attack a jammer just monitor transmission of frames. Upon detection of 
transmission he begins to send interfering signals which corrupts the ongoing frame 
transmission [1].  
 
2.1.4. HR (Hit and Run) attack: Continuous transmission of jamming signals will cost 
high in energy, then consumption of energy will be high. Also, detection of that jammer 
will be easy. But if jamming signals are periodically turned off and on, then not only 
the energy consumption will be and also detection will be difficult  
 
 
2.2 Countermeasures in physical layer  
Detecting if there is an attack performed by a malicious entity or not, is the first step 
against physical layer DOS attacks.  Methods of detection of physical layer DOS 
attacks are described in this section. 
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Some indicators of jamming attacks are low packet delivery ratio (PDR), low 
throughput and high packet latency. But these condition also arises, when there is 
network congestion.  
Two types of jamming detection technique implemented are as follows: location 
consistency and signal strength consistency.  
In signal strength consistency method, a node is said to be under attack of jamming, if 
the average signal strength of incoming signals is high, but the PDR measured for the 
victim is low [2]. The strength level of the signal signifies that the channel is a high 
quality channel. So an unexpected high increase in loss rate of frames in such a channel 
indicates towards an active jamming.  
Location consistency is somewhat similar to signal strength consistency. Despite 
observing that the two nodes are physically close enough but then also the PDR of the 
data flow between them is extremely low, then it signifies presence of a jammer station 
in the vicinity [2]. 
 
2.3 DOS through IP Spoofing 
IP spoofing has been used by DOS Attackers to for flooding traffic. Thus it becomes 
necessary to filter IP packets which are spoofed at or near the victim. As discussed 
earlier only the information in the IP header are used for packet filtering. We know 
that an attacker can falsify fields which are in IP header, but he will not be able fake 
the hop count value of an IP packet. The hop-count value is reflected in the TTL field 
of the IP header indirectly, as from going from the source to destination, the TTL value 
is decreased by one by each router before being forwarded to the next node. The hop-
count from the source and the destination is calculated through subtraction of initial 
TTL value of the packet at the source by final TTL value at the destination. The 
evaluation of TTL field of each arriving packet, its initial TTL value can be deduced, 
and thus the hop-count of each packet. In this work, a hop-count-based filter to detect 
IP packets spoofing is implemented. 
 
 
2.4 Hop Count Filtering 
To filter spoofed IP packets we do validation through hop count inspection. In this 
section first hop count computation is discussed and then inspection algorithm is given. 
2.4.1 TTL based hop count computation 
We know that attacker can only spoof IP part of the packet, it cannot modify the 
number of hops. Since we cannot calculate directly number of hops we indirectly 
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calculate it through TTL Field in IP packet where TTL is time to live and its value get 
decremented by one whenever it crosses a router. TTL is a field in the IP header which 
has size of 8 bit, it is used to lifetime of IP packets in network [4]. At the arrival packet 
at its destination, the final TTL value is difference the initial TTL value and the hop 
count. But the main problem in hop-count computation is that a destination can only 
access final value of TTL. The calculation was surely easier when same initial TTL 
values were used by all Operating system, but it not the picture. Luckily only a few 
particular initial TTL values such as 32, 64, 128 and 255 are used by most of the Oss 
[4]. So we can calculate hop count by subtracting final TTL value by initial TTL value 
which is just greater than that value.   
 
2.4.2 Inspection algorithm 
In this algorithm first the hop count is calculated as mentioned earlier .Now a stored 
hop count is matched with it. This stored hop count is extracted through HCF table or 
IP2HC mapping table which we will discuss later. If both the hop count match for a 
packet then the packet is said to be a legitimate one or else it is said to be spoofed. 
However there is one limitation in this algorithm that if the hop count of spoof packet 
accidently matches the stored hop count then it cannot be marked as spoofed [4]. 
2.4.3 IP2HC mapping table 
Almost 90% of the spoofed IP packets detection is possible through accurate HCF or 
IP2HC table. We minimize the storage requirement of the table by clustering address 
prefixes and without storing hop count of every packet maximizing its effectiveness. 
For clustering we select a method where we build the table by IP addresses clustering 
in which first 24 bits of addresses of each clusters are same and hop count of the 
network being the minimum of all IP addresses inside a 24 bit network [4]. Then the 
table created will have size of 16 MB. In last step to find the stored hop count of packets 
we have to extract first 24 bits of the IP address and indexed to HCF table. We assume 
that values for each field in the table is known beforehand.  
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Chapter 3: Proposed Work 
 
3.1Physical layer counter measures 
3.1.1 Location consistency: As discussed earlier if PDR of a data flow between two 
nodes is exceptionally low, despite distance between them is very less, then it 
indicates the station might be under jamming attack. 
 
a) Calculating distance between two nodes: 
 D=√[(x2-x1)2-(y2-y1)2] 
 Where  
x1: x coordinate of 1st node 
x2: x coordinate of 2nd node 
y1: y coordinate of 1st node 
y2: y coordinate of 2nd node 
 
b) PDR calculation  
snd_packet:=0 
rec_packet:=0 
tracefile:=open(tracefile.tr) 
while i != EOP 
 j=i.split() 
 if j(0)=’s’ and j(2)=_0_ and j(6)=tcp 
 snd_packet=snd_packet+1 
If j(0)=’r’ and j(2)=_0_ and j(6)=tcp 
  Rec_packet+=1 
End 
PDR=rec_packet/snd_packet 
 
 
c) Checking Whether node is under attack or not 
Since we know larger the distance, less will be pdr 
So pdr=k/D 
or k=pdr*D 
And if value of k goes less than a threshold value (th=0.40 say), it may be 
under attack. 
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i.e  
 
if k*100<40: 
 node is under attack 
else: 
 node is not under attack  
 
 
 
3.1.2 Signal Strength Consistency 
We calculate PDR as Described earlier between source and destination node.  
Then we calculate RSS according to the distance between the two nodes. 
 
 
Suppose R0 is signal in node 0 
And D02 is the distance between node 0 and node 2. 
 
Then rss at node 2 with respect to node 0 will be: 
rss2= R0/D02 
Similarly rss3 (rss at node 3 with respect to node 0) will be: 
rss3=R0/D03 
 
so we know  
pdr =K*rss 
or k= pdr/rss 
so If K is less than a threshold value (say th=150) then it is under attack. 
i.e 
if k<150: 
 node is under attack  
else: 
 node is not under attack 
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3.1 Detection of IP Spoofing 
3.2.1 Calculation of sent packets 
To detect an attack, we first calculate number of sent packets from each node to every 
other node and set a threshold of packets.  
We may want to investigate further as an attack, if for each pair of source and 
destination node the number of sent packets exceeds a particular value. 
Given a network traffic dataset (pcap), we analyse it packet by packet. Through dpkt 
library of python we read the pcap file as an array of records in the form of [timestamp, 
packets].we extract all the information like source address, destination address, TTL 
value for each packets. 
Calculation can be done as follows: 
We need a Python dictionary: pktc{} to store number of packets for each packets. 
 
for each packet in pcap: 
 stream=src + ’:’ + dst //creating key for the dictionary 
if pktc.has_key(stream): 
  pktc [stream] = pktc[stream] + 1 
            else: 
                    pktc [stream] = 1 
 
 
where : 
 src=source IP address 
 dst= destination address 
 pktc=dictionary to store packet count value.   
 
This code snippet checks whether the source-destination pair is already present or not 
in dictionary. If it is present then increment value of packet count by one else initialise 
packet count for that pair as 1. 
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Then if any pair exceeds the threshold value(say Thresh =250), then the packet is 
marked as spoofed. 
for stream in pktc: 
        pktsSent = pktc[stream] 
        if pktsSent > Thresh: 
            src = stream.split(':')[0]              //extracting source IP address 
            dst = stream.split(':')[1]            //extracting destination IP address 
            print '[+] '+src+' attacked '+dst+' '+ str(pktsSent) + ' pkts. 
 
where: 
 src=source IP address 
 dst= destination address 
 pktc=dictionary to store packet count value.   
 
3.2.2 TTL Based Hop count inspection 
As mentioned we have to compute the hop count using TTL field of the IP header, as 
it is not stored in thre. Final TTL value is extracted from the packet and the intial TTL 
value is guessed for different OSs.  
For most of the OSs the initial TTL have values 32, 64,128,255. So we can easily 
calculate hop count for a node. 
for each packet in pcap: 
If ( ttl<32 ): 
hop_count=32-ttl  
else if ( ttl=32 ): 
hop_count=0  
else if ( ttl<64 ): 
hop_count=64-ttl  
else if ( ttl=64 ): 
hop_count=0  
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else if ( ttl<128 ): 
hop_count=128-ttl  
else : 
hop_count=255-ttl 
          Hc=hop_count 
 
 
3.2.3 Inspection algorithm 
 The inspection algorithm to find spoofed packets is as follows: 
for each packet in pcap: 
 extract the final TTL T and IP address S; 
 infer the intial TTL T0; 
compute hop count Hc=T0-T; 
index S to get the stored hop count Hs; 
if (Hc != Hs ) 
  packet is spoofed; 
else  
 packet is legitimate;  
3.2.4 HCF (IP2HC mapping ) table (extracting stored hop count value): 
a) Clustering IP addresses based on first 24 bits: 
 
 for each packet in pcap: 
  extract source address S; 
  spl=S.split('.') //splitting each field of IP addr. 
  stream= spl[0] +'.' + spl[1] + '.' +spl[2] //creating 24 bit key 
   if pktc.has_key(stream): 
                  HCF[stream] = min(hop count) 
             else: 
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                  HCF[stream] = hop count of given IP address. 
d) Indexing IP address to get stored IP address: 
for each packet in pcap: 
  extract source address S; 
  spl=S.split('.') //splitting each field of IP addr. 
  key= spl[0] + '.' + spl[1] + '.' +spl[2]            //creating 24 bit key 
  Hs = HCF[key] 
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Chapter 4: Simulation Results 
4.1 Location and Signal Strength consistency implementation results 
This simulation is done in NS2. 
1) Network considered for location and signal strength consistency. 
Channel Type: Wireless 
Radio Propagation Model: Two Ray Ground 
MAC Type: 802.11 
Interface Queue Type: Drop tail 
Antenna Model: Omni Antenna 
Routing Protocol: DSDV 
Number of nodes: 8 
Area(x*y):1000*1000
 
Figure 1. Network considered 
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2) Calculation of distance between the nodes. 
As seen from figure of the network considered, there are 8 nodes. The distance 
between each pair is calculated by the distance formula mentioned in above 
section. 
 
Figure 2. Distance between each node pair 
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3) Trace file of the network 
As seen from figure 1, it is seen that there is transfer of TCP data between node 
0 and node 2. There are various other signals exchanged between nodes. The 
trace file generated captures all signals between nodes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trace file generated by the network 
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4) Results of location consistency: 
The packet delivery ratio is calculated and also the distance between the nodes 
0 and 2. After verification it is found out that node 2 is not under jamming attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Result of location consistency 
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5) Received signal strength at various nodes w.r.t node 0 
We find the received signal strength (RSS) of every node with respect to node 0 
as mention in the earlier chapter. This RSS of node is then further used.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.Recieved signal strength of every nodes with respect to node 0 
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6) Result of Signal Strength consistency 
The packet delivery ratio is calculated just as we did in location consistency. 
And also we have calculated the RSS at node 1. Then by verification it is 
found out that it is not under attack.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Result of signal strength consistency 
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4.2 TTL Based Hop Count Computation 
 
1) Calculating sent packets form each source to destination. 
The count of number of packet sent from one address to another address is 
stored in a python dictionary where the source- destination is used as the key 
to store the packet count. If same source destination pair is encountered the 
respective entry is incremented by one else a new entry is created and 
initialized by 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 sent packets count between two addresses 
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2) Checking which source exceeded the threshold (150): 
The sent packet counts are then checked, whether they are exceeding the 
threshold value or not. Exceeding it may be a sign of an attack.  
 
Figure 8 source addresses whose sent packet count exceed threshold value 
 
3) TTL values for each packet with source and destination IP addresses. 
In this result source IP address, destination IP address and TTL value is 
extracted from pcap file. 
 
 
Figure 9. Source IP address, destination IP address and TTL value extracted from the file 
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4) Result of applying inspection algorithm, whether an IP is spoofed or not:   
The hop count for each packet is calculated and matched through indexing in 
HCF table. As mentioned earlier if Hc!=  Hs, then the packet is marked as 
spoofed otherwise legitimate. In the figures below it is shown whether a packet  
is spoofed or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 result showing packet from 8135 to 8173, whether 
they are spoofed or not 
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Figure 11Figure 10 result showing packet from 8135 to 8173, whether they are 
spoofed or not 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and future scope 
In this work we presented location strength consistency, signal strength consistency 
and hop count filtering method to detect DOS. Though they are not the best solution 
around but they are deployable. Based on our analysis we can say that they are effective 
enough to be implemented. 
Further investigation may include in making HCF table more efficient by further 
clustering the IP addresses. Moreover this method can further be modified to detect 
and then drop the spoofed packets. We need to further refine the methods effectiveness. 
These are fields of our future work.   
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